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BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
         William Ersek, a golf professional who suffered 
employment reverses incident to adverse newspaper reports about 
an investigation of his stewardship at a Township-owned golf 
course, brought a federal civil rights action, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
against the Township and a number of its top officials on account 
of false statements made by one of the officials about the 
matter.  Ersek's appeal from the grant of summary judgment in 
favor of the defendants raises a number of interesting questions 
under § 1983.  However, his claim founders because there is 
insufficient evidence to show that the false statements 
themselves caused him harm.  Accordingly, we will affirm the 
grant of summary judgment for defendants. 
 
                                I. 
         From 1963 until the end of 1991, Ersek was employed as 
the golf professional at a municipally owned and operated golf 
course, the Springfield Country Club, in Delaware County, 
Pennsylvania.  From 1963 until 1987, Springfield Township 
employed Ersek pursuant to successive one-year employment 
contracts.  In 1987, Ersek signed a four-year contract.  Ersek's 
duties as the Springfield golf pro were varied:  he managed the 
pro shop and snack bar at the course, supervised the other 
employees at the course, and collected the fees for playing the 
course and renting the golf carts. 
         During the summer of 1989, a Township employee, 
responding to complaints by Ersek that construction on the golf 
course had resulted in a lower volume of paying golfers, counted 
the golfers on the course.  The Township employee noticed that 
the number of golfers actually on the course did not correspond 
to the number of golfers Ersek reported to the Township.  Michael 
Lefevre, the Township Manager and a defendant in the case, 
noticed the same discrepancies.  The matter was referred to the 
Township police.  After some investigation in the fall of 1989, 
the police decided to conduct surveillance during the spring and 
summer of 1990.  The police inspection uncovered further 
discrepancies. 
         In August 1990, the police and Township employees 
notified the Township Board of Commissioners ("the Board"), a 
defendant in the case, of the results of their probe.  Until that 
time, no member of the Board knew of the investigation.  Bernard 
Stein, the President of the Board and also a defendant, informed 
the police that the Board would be willing to prosecute Ersek 
criminally if there were sufficient evidence to do so.  After 
obtaining a search warrant, the police carried out a search of 
the pro shop and seized records stored therein.  Ersek 
volunteered to the police that he kept additional records at his 
home.  The police obtained a second search warrant and then made 
a search of Ersek's home, seizing documents stored there as well. 
         The Board discussed the Ersek case at a public meeting 
six days after the police searches.  Stein read a public 
statement, earlier approved by the entire Board in executive 
session, concerning the case.  Lefevre had also attended the 
executive session.  The statement falsely claimed that the Board 
had not only been aware of the investigation since its outset but 
also had directed the entire undertaking.  The admitted reason 
for the fabrication was to mislead the Township residents into 
believing that the Board had been pro-active in overseeing the 
golf course.  The statement did not, however, refer to Ersek nor 
contain other false claims.  After the Township meeting, local 
newspapers, and also The Philadelphia Inquirer, reported on the 
investigations and ran stories referring to Ersek by name. 
         Ersek had been suffering from health problems and, in 
the wake of the searches, did not return to work for several 
months.  Although the Township continued to pay him for the time 
he spent away from the course, it moved to restructure the 
management of the course.  For instance, the Township took 
control of the pro shop and responsibility for course employees. 
         Nearing the contract's expiration in 1991, the Township 
offered to renew Ersek's contract, but under substantially 
altered terms.  The salary under the proposed contract would have 
been significantly less than that of the existing contract.  
Ersek refused to accept the terms of the proposed contract, and 
the Township hired a different golf professional.  Ersek then 
sought job interviews with other country clubs in the area, but 
to no avail.  Ersek claims that the cloud placed over his head by 
the publicized investigation made securing employment at another 
golf course impossible. 
         Ersek brought suit against the Township and against a 
number of Township officials alleging a variety of federal civil 
rights and pendent state law claims.  In an initial order, the 
district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss Ersek's 
substantive due process claims, and ordered Ersek to file an 
amended complaint to address deficiencies with respect to some of 
the other claims.  See Ersek v. Township of Springfield, Delaware 
County, 822 F. Supp. 218 (E.D. Pa. 1993).  In so doing, the court 
held that the Township did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in 
offering Ersek a renewed contract under markedly different terms; 
considering Ersek's ill health and age (Ersek was 59 years old at 
the time), the court found it not unreasonable for the Township 
to act as it did.  Ersek subsequently dismissed a number of 
defendants and abandoned a number of claims voluntarily. 
         In a later order, the district court granted the 
remaining defendants' motion for summary judgment as to all 
existing federal law claims.  Relying primarily on Paul v. Davis, 
424 U.S. 693 (1976) and Clark v. Township of Falls, 890 F.2d 611 
(3d Cir. 1989), the court held that Ersek could not make out a 
claim for a violation of procedural due process because he could 
not show that the Township's actions infringed on a 
constitutionally protected interest.  Specifically, the district 
court held that the fabrications contained in the Township's 
public statement did not harm Ersek to the extent that they 
violated a liberty interest in his reputation.  And, even if 
those fabrications had harmed him, the court continued, Ersek 
failed to adduce evidence that he suffered more than mere 
financial harm so as to rise to liberty interest.  The district 
court also dismissed the pendent state law claims with leave to 
file them in state court. 
         Ersek appeals from the district court's final order 
granting summary judgment, and includes in his appeal the court's 
order dismissing his substantive due process claims.  The case 
raises both federal questions and pendent state law claims, and 
the district court properly exercised its jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367; we exercise appellate jurisdiction 
over this appeal of a final district court order pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review is plenary as to the appeal both from 
the order granting summary judgment and that granting the motion 
to dismiss. 
                               II. 
         We must perforce begin by considering whether Ersek had 
a protectible liberty interest sufficient to trigger due process 
protections.  The Supreme Court, in the seminal case of 
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), recognized that 
an individual has a protectible interest in reputation.  It 
stated that "[w]here a person's good name, reputation, honor, or 
integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to 
him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential."  Id.at 437.  
The Court then went on to strike down a state statute 
that failed to provide an individual with the opportunity to 
challenge a government official's posting notice that no one may 
provide alcoholic beverages to that individual because of his 
problems with alcohol.  Id. at 439.  The inquiry is, however, 
more complicated today in light of intervening case law. 
         For government action to infringe the "reputation, 
honor, or integrity" of an individual, that government action 
first must involve a publication that is substantially and 
materially false.  See Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627 - 29 
(1977); Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 5 v. Tucker, 868 F.2d 
74, 82 (3d Cir. 1989).  The principal relief to which an 
individual is entitled should the government's stigmatizing 
comments rise to the level of a due process violation is a 
hearing to clear his name.  See Codd, 429 U.S. at 627; Board of 
Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 & n.12 
(1972).  If there is no factual dispute that "has some 
significant bearing on the employee's reputation," then a name- 
clearing hearing would serve no useful purpose.  See Codd, 429 
U.S. at 627.  In other words, the disputed or false statements 
must harm the plaintiff. 
         In this case, Ersek claimed that false statements 
impaired his opportunities for future employment as a golf pro.  
Ersek has adduced ample evidence to create a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether the publicity about the fact of an 
investigation did such harm.  See McKnight v. Southeastern 
Pennsylvania Trans. Auth., 583 F.2d 1229, 1236 (3d Cir. 1978) 
(holding that harm to future employment possibilities may show 
sufficient stigma to allow a claim for a violation of a liberty 
interest).  That the publicity may have harmed Ersek is not, 
however, the end of this inquiry, because the harm must be caused 
by the falsity of the statements and the fact of the 
investigation is true.  Thus, we must now determine whether the 
false statements made by the Township affected Ersek's 
reputation. 
         It is undisputed that the public statement announcing 
the investigation at the Township golf course contained the false 
statement that the Board had known about and directed the 
investigation from its outset.  Ersek contends that a public 
statement including such a fabricated claim could give rise to 
the false impression that the probe was a serious, non-routine 
matter.  It is not usual for a legislative body to be engaged in 
the investigation of possible criminal activities.  In Ersek's 
submission, anyone learning of the Board's (false) involvement 
could conclude that Ersek's alleged misdeeds were of an unusual 
nature calling for extraordinary measures, and such a conclusion 
would have a significant bearing on Ersek's reputation because 
more serious allegations would likely engender more serious harm 
to an individual's reputation.  Had the statement only mentioned 
the police involvement and omitted the Board's putative activity, 
the argument continues, there would be no cause to overstate the 
seriousness of the allegations. 
         We are unconvinced.  As we have stated, Ersek must show 
that the false comments made by the Township caused him some 
harm.  The problem with Ersek's argument is that the only false 
statements were that the Board had been heavily involved in the 
investigation at the golf course.  Notwithstanding Ersek's 
protestations, we cannot imagine that such fabrications caused 
more harm than would a statement that truthfully said that only 
the police and a few Township officials were investigating him.  
Should Ersek receive the hearing to which he claims he is 
entitled, the most for which he can seemingly ask in the hearing 
is the opportunity to show that the investigation was not 
conducted by the Board and that any inference that the 
investigation was unusual is incorrect.  That hearing could not 
be used to prove Ersek's innocence.  He would still have hanging 
over his head the cloud of a police investigation.  It seems 
fanciful that any golf course that refused to hire Ersek because 
of the statement actually given would now consider hiring him 
because only the police (and not the Board) were investigating 
him. 
         In sum, the false statements in this case simply have 
not caused Ersek harm that a name-clearing hearing could correct.  
It was the fact of the investigation, not who conducted the 
investigation, that might have injured Ersek's reputation.  
Because Ersek cannot dispute the fact of the investigation, a 
name-clearing hearing would be of no consequence to him.  AccordHomar v. 
Gilbert, 89 F.3d 1009, 1021 - 22 (3d Cir. 1996) (denying 
a procedural due process claim, in part based on the reasoning 
that the truthful disclosure of a pending investigation did not 
stigmatize the plaintiff); S & D Maintenance Co. v. Goldin, 844 
F.2d 962, 970 - 71 (2d Cir. 1988) (same). 
                               III. 
         Because we conclude that no genuine issue of material 
fact exists as to Ersek's claim that the false statements made by 
the Township stigmatized him, the order of the district court 
granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment will be 
affirmed. 
